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Poaching for ivory has caused a steep decline in African elephant (Loxodonta africana) 4 
populations over the past decade (1). This crisis has fuelled a contentious global debate over which 5 
ivory policy would best conserve elephants: ban trade, or enable regulated trade to incentivize and 6 
fund elephant conservation (2). The deep-seated deadlock on ivory policy consumes valuable 7 
resources, and creates an antagonistic environment among elephant conservationists. Conflict over 8 
the trade in ivory is emblematic of the impasses that have characterised international decision-9 
making around wildlife trade for iconic taxa, including elephants, rhinos, sea turtles, and tigers (2). 10 
We argue that the lack of convergence is rooted in incompatible underlying views, and that 11 
successful solutions must begin by recognising the different mental models (cognitive frameworks 12 
of how actions lead to outcomes (3)) and values that underlie ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ĚŝǀĞƌŐŝŶg positions (4). 13 
Similarly polarised arenas, such as negotiations to end armed conflicts (5) and address climate 14 
change (6), have made progress using approaches that allow for structured, iterative trust-building 15 
as part of evaluating policy options among parties.   16 
 17 
Conflicting views on how to save elephants 18 
Many argue that prohibiting all trade in ivory will reduce poaching and conserve elephants 19 
(7). Stakeholders that support ivory bans also advocate the destruction of ivory stockpiles and steps 20 
to reduce demand for ivory. Kenya and most west and central African countries with wild elephant 21 
populations subscribe to this approach (see Table S1). Critics of this approach argue that trade bans 22 
and stockpile destruction have the perverse effect of increasing the ivory price through perceived 23 
scarcity, incentivising further poaching, and that there is limited evidence of successful demand 24 
reduction from these actions (8). Trade bans are also difficult to enforce in countries with poor 25 
governance, carry high social costs of enforcement, and limit opportunities to use sustainably-26 
managed elephant populations and their ivory to generate funds for conservation and community 27 
benefits (e.g. 2, 8, 9).  28 
 29 
An alternative approach proposed for elephant conservation is to allow legal ivory trade 30 
through regulated markets, with ivory harvested from animals that die naturally or are killed for 31 
other reasons (e.g. problem animal control) (9). Revenue from ivory can be used to provide income 32 
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to rural communities that bear the costs of living with elephants (e.g., attacks on humans, crop 33 
raids), and fund conservation and development programmes. The southern African countries that 34 
advocate this approach, such as South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, have large elephant 35 
populations and lower rates of poaching than other African nations (10). Critics of this approach 36 
argue that legal sales stimulate demand by implying that purchasing ivory is socially acceptable. 37 
Legalised trade can also facilitate laundering of illegal ivory, particularly in countries with high levels 38 
of corruption that would struggle to regulate a legal trade (7).  39 
Despite this lack of agreement, the first approach has more policy momentum. Stockpile 40 
destruction has increased more than six-fold since 2011. There have been significant efforts to 41 
criminalise trade, including commitments to near-total domestic bans on commercial ivory trade in 42 
the United States (2016), China and UK (2017), and a motion to stop all legal domestic ivory sales 43 
passed at the 2016 IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature) World Conservation 44 
Congress. However, the polarisation continues as pro-trade countries and NGOs disagree with the 45 
current policy direction (Table S1).   46 
 47 
Polarised debates 48 
Heated debates about elephants and ivory have dominated meetings of the Convention on 49 
the Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) Conference of the Parties (CoP) for nearly 30 years, where 50 
183 signatory countries debate and negotiate global policies in the trade of flora and fauna (Table 51 
S1). For example, following a fierce debate at the October 2016 CoP, a proposal by Namibia and 52 
Zimbabwe to trade ivory was defeated. CITES debates are influenced by the positions of NGOs that 53 
mobilise media and public attention, lobby signatories, and provide technical advice and support 54 
(2). Because all signatory countries have an equal vote on proposals to CITES, some countries with 55 
wild elephant populations  ? ?range states ? ? have expressed frustration that they have limited 56 
influence in CITES negotiations despite bearing the costs of resulting decisions (2). 57 
There have been several efforts to find common ground among range states and other 58 
stakeholders with divergent views on ivory trade. For example, the African Elephant Range States 59 
Dialogues brought nations together to discuss relevant conservation and trade issues (11). A series 60 
of African Elephant Meetings developed the African Elephant Action Plan in which all range states 61 
expressed support for securing sustainable elephant populations throughout their present and 62 
potential range in Africa, and for realising ĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚƐ ? potential to provide cultural and socio-63 
economic benefits. In 1997 parties to CITES established two global monitoring systems: MIKE 64 
(Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants) and ETIS (the Elephant Trade Information System) for 65 
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collecting and analysing data on poaching, mortality and illegal ivory trade to monitor the trade and 66 
provide evidence for decision-making.  67 
Despite these efforts and the evidence available through MIKE and ETIS, the polarisation on 68 
ivory trade persists. There is no consensus on what the primary causes of the high levels of poaching 69 
are,1 and which policy options on ivory could resolve the crisis (2, 7, 9). We contend this continued 70 
polarisation stems from a failure to recognise conflicting mental models about elephant 71 
conservation, and the values that underpin them (4).   Mental models and values are influential in 72 
the interpretation of evidence  ?  people are more likely to unconsciously challenge the credibility of 73 
information that deviates from their values (i.e., confirmation bias;  (12-14)). For example, the 74 
interpretation of evidence on climate change and gun control policy among respondents in the USA 75 
ǁĂƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ76 
by their scientific or mathematical literacy (12).  77 
Values also affect how stakeholders perceive trade-offs, contributing to positions that 78 
appear irreconcilable, despite agreement about the overarching goal of elephant conservation. 79 
Three types of trade-off can be identified ǁŚĞŶ ?Ɛacred values ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ?ƚŚŽƐĞǁŝƚŚ transcendental 80 
significance, such as human rights, nature, and justice) ĂŶĚ ?secular values ? ?Ğ ?Ő ? ?cost-effectiveness) 81 
are involved (4, 15). Routine trade-offs pit secular values against each other, and can be acceptably 82 
evaluated using rational cost-benefit logic (e.g., whether to invest in new hospital equipment or 83 
more staff). Tragic trade-offs involve trading-off one sacred value against another  ? e.g., saving the 84 
life of one patient over another. There is acceptance that tragic trade-offs exist and have to be dealt 85 
with. However, taboo trade-offs pit a secular value against a sacred value (e.g., saving the life of one 86 
patient through a costly intervention versus securing the financial sustainability of a hospital) (4, 87 
15). Taboo trade-offs are inherently uncomfortable and generate both moral outrage and a 88 
reluctance to deal with the issue (4). Debates over decisions on ivory trade ? notably the sacred 89 
value that the trade of any elephant-derived product is morally unacceptable (16) versus the secular 90 
value that ivory is a source of conservation revenue  ?  entail a taboo trade-off (Figure 1).  91 
 92 
Navigating divergent mental models and taboo trade-offs 93 
Unblocking the current impasse on ivory trade requires space for experimentation and 94 
learning, as well as trust-building among stakeholders (Figure 1)(5, 6). An iterative process built on 95 
five elements, that draws on experiences from other polarised contexts (5, 6), offers a way forward. 96 
First, the range states, as part of their own ongoing dialogues on elephant conservation, 97 
should reconfirm the conservation objectives that they aim to achieve (17) and explore the values 98 
that underlie their perspectives (18).  99 
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Second, a process for eliciting and sharing different mental models of how various actions 100 
affect objectives (including consideration of other threats to elephants, such as habitat loss) is 101 
required. Mental models exist at both individual and group level, and their elicitation and discussion 102 
will clarify where the differences and common ground lie in stakeholder conceptualisations of how 103 
policy interventions work (3). It will expose specific areas of disagreement and knowledge gaps 104 
about the impacts of policy interventions, informing participants on where further evidence needs 105 
to be gathered. Moreover, sharing mental models can foster the emergence of innovative solutions 106 
(3). For example, tension between wool-producing farmers and conservationists in New South 107 
Wales, Australia, involved fundamental differences concerning the perceived impacts of expanding 108 
consĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŚĞĨĂƌŵŝŶŐŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ƐƐƵƌǀŝǀĂů ?dŚƌŽƵŐŚĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŚĂƚƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚĂŶĚĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚ109 
ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶŐ mental models, it became apparent that farmers had the capacity to 110 
manage land for conservation, enabling conservation stewardship to become established on 111 
pastoral land (see also Table S2) (3). A similar process of articulating pro- and anti-trade 112 
stakeholders ?ŵĞŶƚĂůŵŽĚĞůƐ may highlight that pro-trade countries view ivory as an essential, 113 
sustainable source of revenue for conservation. In this case, a commitment to provide other equally 114 
valuable revenue sources to replace ivory sales could potentially be an acceptable alternative.  115 
Third, there needs to be a structured approach to evaluating and synthesising evidence on 116 
the consequences of different policy options, using methods that minimise bias and that are 117 
considered legitimate by all participants (19). The identified knowledge gaps must then be 118 
addressed by collecting evidence through credible mechanisms that participants agree to accept 119 
(20). 120 
Fourth, there should be discussion among stakeholders about the trade-offs involved in 121 
ĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌƐŚĂƌĞĚĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŚŽǁƚŚĞƐĞƌĞůĂƚĞƚŽƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ122 
value systems. This may reveal that trade-offs that are perceived as taboo by some stakeholders 123 
(e.g. morality of selling ivory versus secular benefits of money from ivory) are seen as a tragic trade-124 
off by others (e.g., the morality of selling ivory versus the morality of conserving elephant 125 
populations and supporting poverty alleviation through a sustainable nature-based revenue source) 126 
(Figure 1) (4, 15, 16). Such discussions can incorporate available evidence, and assist in the 127 
identification of policies and interventions that are more acceptable to a broader group of 128 
stakeholders (15).  129 
Finally, there needs to be an accepted manner by which the process feeds into decision-130 
making at different levels, including via proposals and votes at CITES CoPs (Figure 1). Circumstances 131 
vary widely among range states, making a single continent-wide policy unlikely and inappropriate; 132 
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but if this process is successful, it could lead to range states supporting each other on locally 133 
appropriate policy proposals at CITES, defusing long-term debates and conflicts. 134 
Unlike previous efforts to bring diverse stakeholders together on ivory trade, our proposed 135 
process is structured and explicit in its recognition of the values and mental models underlying 136 
different positions (Figure 1). It will require iterative discussions among range states, with input 137 
from technical experts where needed, and include NGOs, conservation donors, and other key 138 
stakeholders at appropriate times. Importantly, experience from other apparently-intractable 139 
issues, such as negotiating the end to armed conflict in Colombia and apartheid in South Africa (5), 140 
and international climate change negotiations (6), suggests that iterative interactions among a small 141 
group of key parties is more likely to engender trust and agreement, than an international vote 142 
open to the media and campaigning pressures. For example, the success of the 2016 Paris climate 143 
agreement built on a prior bilateral agreement between the US and China that stemmed from a 144 
working group that met several times ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐǀŝĞǁĨŽƌŽǀĞƌƚǁŽǇĞĂƌƐ(6). Indeed, 145 
experience from the African Range States Dialogues suggests that concordance on ivory policy may 146 
best be found outside the public and adversarial environment of CITES CoPs (11).  147 
Africa has experienced an alarming reduction in elephant numbers since 2007 (1, 10) yet 148 
range states and NGOs remain in deadlock on ivory policy in response. The next CITES CoP is less 149 
than two years away. We recognise that the politics around ivory policy are challenging, but urge 150 
range states to begin a structured process to negotiate the diverse perspectives in this contentious 151 
debate as soon as possible, supported by organisations committed to elephant conservation. 152 
Successful navigation of different mental models and values, and the trade-offs they imply, will not 153 
only enable greater collective action on elephant conservation  ?  but also provide an example of 154 
how to enhance the structured use of evidence in CITES decision-making on other globally iconic 155 
taxa. 156 






Figure 1: Illustrative figure of how sacred and secular values imply different types of trade-offs, and how 161 
mental models affect ivory policy debates. (a) Values: Stakeholders hold different values that affects how 162 
trade-offs are perceived. Some of these values are shared between pro-trade and anti-trade sides whereas 163 
others are not. Values shown are illustrative and not comprehensive. (b) Mental Models: The values shown 164 
in (a) influence the mental models of how different policy options will lead to successful elephant 165 
conservation. (c) Platform for deliberation: An iterative process between a small group of key stakeholders 166 
(e.g., African elephant range states) with input from technical experts can build an understanding among 167 
stakeholders of the different values and mental models in policy discussions. This process can identify 168 
evidence gaps, clarify misapprehensions and identify common ground and potential novel solutions. The 169 
process can also illuminate that the taboo trade-offs that underlie policy conflicts can also be seen as tragic 170 
trade-offs. For example, the trade-off between conservation and the morality of selling ivory, because pro-171 
trade groups perceive selling ivory as essential to conserving elephants. The process can therefore aid 172 
identification of more broadly acceptable solutions. In seeking to reveal mental models, this process can 173 




Supplementary Materials 178 
 179 
Table S1 with selected CITES proposals by pro-and anti-trade sides to show the long-180 




Table S2 How mental models and cognitive mapping have been used to contribute to 183 
understanding and resolving conflict and tension and strengthening collaboration   184 
 185 
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